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SUMMARY

The main findings of this study were:

1. A high proportion of farm operators who had the most security on the land for their age came from great families which were most familistic in their farming. The relationship between these two variables, familism and security, is not close for the whole county ($r = .21$), although it is statistically significant ($p = .01$).

2. The association between familism in farming and security on the land was least among farmers who were in their early maturity during the two decades of agricultural depression, the 1920's and 1930's.

3. The farm operators with the most stable occupational histories came from the great families that were most familistic in their farming. The familistic did the least farm wage work and nonfarm work. They stayed on the home farm longest. They more often went directly from home to operatorship, but they seldom became farm operators or farm owners at younger ages.

4. The most stable residence was found where familism in farming was greatest. Farm operators who were born on the farms they occupied when interviewed were preponderantly the most familistic. The less familistic farm operators were found farther from their birthplaces.

5. Several phases of farm operatorship had little association with familism if the age of the operators was not held constant. The familistic had not had longer or fewer tenancies. They included no more than their share of farm owners. The familistic tenants had no more than their share of assurance that they might continue to occupy their farms; they had only average freedom in managing their farms. They did not operate larger farms, although among owner-operators they owned somewhat larger farms and paid off their mortgages earlier.

6. Family characteristics other than familism in farming, as measured, failed to account for security on the land. Familism in sociability was measured by the exchange of meals and visits within the great family but it didn't seem to be associated with security on the land. Neither did family affluence in farming; the total size of the family, or the number of brothers; ethnicity manifested in national origin or church preference; or the sharing of responsibilities and work tasks by the marriage pair.

7. Possible reasons why familism in farming accounted for security on the land no more than it did are: (a) Familism provides no immunity to the epidemic psychology of a land boom. Familism may slow up recovery if sentiment for the

home farm delays the fresh start that follows foreclosure, or if the resources of relatives are used up in a futile effort to hold the farm. (b) All farmers receive the same prices and experience the same business cycle. (c) Many of the advantages of family cooperation can be achieved in other relationships. Give and take, mutual trust and generosity can characterize the lending, selling, work exchange and other relations of nonrelatives as well as family members. (d) Individuals are sometimes handicapped by giving family aid. Fathers run risks for their children and sometimes lose. Sons who help their parents hold the home farm may get off to late starts as operators themselves.

It was concluded that while familism in farming by great families is not a guarantee of security on the land, it is a valuable aid to farm operators. Family unity is not a substitute for the knowledge, skill and larger organization that farmers need to survive in a commercial agriculture, but it helps.

Family Factors in Tenure Experience: Hamilton County, Iowa, 1946[1]

By Robert A. Rohwer

ORIGIN OF THE STUDY

This study was made to determine whether family relationships and farm activities within family groups affect the tenure situations and occupational experiences of farm operators.

Farm people have always wanted to own the land they operate. They have thought that farm ownership would bring prestige, an end to moving about, freedom to improve the home and farm, greater profits or a chance to retire. For these reasons, and possibly others, most farmers have tried to climb the agricultural ladder [2] as rapidly as possible.[3] Recently another phase of farm tenure has become more important. Many farmers fear that next year, or the year after, they may be without a place. There aren't enough farms to go around to all who want them.[4] Because of different tenure circumstances, some farmers suffer from this insecurity more than others.

Almost every farmer wants to be as secure on the land as possible. Is the farmer who tries to solve the problem of security alone the most successful? Or is there an advantage in families' working together? Iowa farm people constantly must decide whether to face the problem as a family or as individuals.

They face more questions: Should the family help the young son to begin farming for himself? Should a son-in-law be helped the same as a son? The young man and his

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[1] Project 981 of the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station.

[2] Spillman, W. J. The Agricultural Ladder. American Econ. Review Supplement, **9**: 170-179. 1919.

[3] Iowa farmers have persisted in aspiring to farm ownership even though, until sometime after 1935, the achievement of ownership by farm operators tended to diminish. Although Hamilton County farmers wanted other things too, they almost all desired to own farms. Of 144 farm operators questioned in 1946, 76 already owned farm land, 58 planned or hoped to own, and 7 regretted not owning but felt too old to undertake ownership. Only three stated, in a way that indicated a preference for renting indefinitely, that they did not plan to buy a farm sometime.

J. A. Starrak interviewed 372 Iowa farm tenants who had begun farming as operators during the years 1930-38. He found that 96 percent "expected to become owners." Problems of Beginning Farmers in Iowa. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta., Res. Bul. **313**: 517 and 545-546. 1943.

See appendix table A, Proportions of Tenancy, 1880-1945, in the United States, Iowa, and Hamilton County for the record of ownership achievement.

[4] Starrak (op. cit. p. 518) concluded, concerning 504 farmers who began farming in Iowa between 1930 and 1938, that "for those who do not have near relatives who own land, the obtaining of good farm land is the most difficult problem." Obtaining land was probably as hard or harder in 1946 than it was in 1938.

wife must consider the chances of getting started when they decide whether or not to take up farming. Families can do some of their farm work together, or they can avoid each other. Is it worthwhile to try to keep a family member on the home place? Each day questions such as these must be decided by farm families and individual farmers.

Educators, clergymen, extension workers and others who guide and counsel farmers must choose between recommending family action and suggesting individual action. Whether to make it easier or harder for farm families to act as a group is an important problem in farm policy.

Several considerations suggested that family group behavior might affect security on the land. Many family names persist on land ownership plat books. Members of certain closely knit families known to the author appeared to gain strength from their family unity for solving fundamental farm problems. They seemed to have an advantage in starting farming and they seemed to have to move less often. Scholars in other areas seemed to find the same thing: The behavior of families might account for some of the differences among farm operators in their security on the land and in their occupational experience.

PURPOSE AND HYPOTHESES

This research was intended to answer three general questions: (1) What is the relationship between familism in farming and security on the land? (2) Does familism in farming appear to affect the occupational histories of farmers? (3) Does a farm operator's security on the land seem to vary with other characteristics of his family, such as the number of his brothers and sisters, their nationality, the relationship between the operator and his wife, and other family considerations?

Affirmative answers to these questons were the major hypotheses guiding the study.

PREVIOUS WORK

These hypotheses grew largely out of two recent Wisconsin studies. Salter described the land tenure process in a relatively prosperous, Corn Belt type township. He concluded that under a system of fee simple ownership the processes of birth and death combined with the encumbrance of property in land inevitably tend to diminish owner-operatorship.[5] Salter viewed the family mainly as individuals whose interests split the equity in the farm.

[5] Salter, Leonard, A., Jr. Land Tenure in Process. Wis. Agr. Exp. Sta., Res. Bul. **146**: 42. 1943.

Parsons and Waples studied an exceptional community. There the deliberate group action of families had successfully maintained a high degree of owner-operatorship.[6] Families worked together so well that very young men became owner-operating farmers. In this area the family, not the individual, was the unit of action. Apparently the difference in family unity in the two areas was responsible for divergent findings.

Almost all of the farmers in the area Parsons and Waples studied were owner-operators with a great deal of security on the land. In areas where owner-operatorship is not high, could it be that the most successful in achieving security on the land come from families like the ones they studied? Do the farm operators with the least security on the land come from families that don't approach their farming as a group? Perhaps in a relatively wealthy, Corn Belt county, security on the land would be found associated with family unity for farm action.

METHODOLOGY

GENERAL PROCEDURE

DESIGN OF THE STUDY

To learn the relationship between a farm operator's security on the land and the familism in farming of his great family,[6a] three steps were planned: (1) devising a method of measuring degrees of family unity; (2) measuring degrees of security on the land; and (3) relating the two.

Five aspects of familism in farming were selected for constructing an index. Each of the five factors was described as a continuum, from a familistic pole to an individualistic pole. The polarities were constructed types of familism and individualism. Each continuum was divided into two parts. Actual families were sorted into two categories on either side of the division. Every farm operator's family, then, was labeled as familistic or nonfamilistic on each of five factors. The index consisted of the number of times (of a possible five) that a family scored familistically.

Security on the land was measured by arranging farm operators in nine ordered categories, from most secure to least. The operators were also classified in five age groups. Within each age group a most secure third, a middle third and the least secure third were marked off. Each farm operator,

[6] Parsons, K. H., and Waples, E. O. Keeping the Farm in the Family. Wis. Agr. Exp. Sta., Res. Bul. 157. 1945.

[6a] The great family refers to the larger kinship group beyond the husband, wife and their immature children.

then, was in one of the three "thirds" as compared with others about his age.

The main method of relating the security on the land of farm operators and the familism in farming of their great families was simple linear correlation. The simple index of familism in farming, ranging from 0 to 5, was correlated with the ranked thirds of security on the land.[7]

To learn the relationship between a farm operator's occupational experience and the familism in farming of his great family, the same simple index of familism was used. Farm operators' occupational experience was divided into a number of phases, such as years at home, years in wage work, and age at first owning a farm. Chi-square and the coefficient of contingency were used to test and measure the association.[8]

To learn the relationship between a farm operator's security on the land and other characteristics of his family, the same ranked thirds of security on the land were used. The several family characteristics, such as the number of siblings, their nationality or the family's wealth, were considered one at a time. Chi-square and the coefficient of contingency were used again to test and measure the association.

PLACE OF WORK

A county unit was chosen to avoid generalizing for only an exceptional community, a single ethnic group or some other local peculiarity. The several nationality backgrounds of the farm people in Hamilton County, Iowa, and their nine community centers are shown in figs. 1 and 2.

Hamilton County is mainly agricultural. Nearly half of its total population is rural-farm, and farms include 98.8 percent of the land area of the county. Most of the land is level and fertile. The farmers specialize and produce for the market; few farms are classified as producing "products primarily for own household use." Though commercial, the farms are family size in that most of the work is done by the farm operator and his family.[9] By using a lot of power

[7] Simple linear correlation is explained in most introductory statistics texts. See for example: T. C. McCormick's "Elementary Social Statistics" Ch. X, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1941; F. C. Mills' "Statistical Methods" (rev. ed.) Ch. X, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1938; or George W. Snedecor's "Statistical Methods" (4th ed.) Ch. 7, The Iowa State College Press, Ames, Iowa, 1946.

[8] Discussion of chi-square may also be found in McCormick, op. cit., Mills, or Snedecor. For the coefficient of contingency see McCormick, pp. 203-208.

[9] It is recognized that whether the operator's family and the farm labor force are approximately the same is only one of a number of considerations in a rigorous definition of family size farms or family type farming. It should also be noted that farms can be both commercial and family size if commercial is defined as production mainly for the market and family size is defined in terms of the operating family's providing the land, labor, capital and management.

machinery the farm operators produce a tremendous amount with relatively little hired help. In 1945 more than half of the farms in the county reported a total value of products of $6,000 or more per farm.[10]



Fig. 1. Areas of predominant nationality descent, Hamilton County, Iowa, 1947. (By permission of Paul J. Jehlik and Ray E. Wakeley.)

Hamilton County is not one of the nation's largest counties. But it ranked among the first 100 counties in the United States in 1944 in acreage and production of oats, soybeans and corn, and in number of hogs and pigs and turkeys on farms.[11] The index of the level of living enjoyed by Hamilton County farm families in 1945 was 189 compared with a national average of 100.[12]

Farming is both commercial and prosperous in the area selected. The county is also a relatively secular rural social structure.[13] If security on the land inevitably becomes less with commercial agriculture and secular living, then we should not expect to find family factors important here.

DRAWING THE SAMPLE

A random sample of individual farm operators was drawn in 1946 from the operators of farms which meet the Census definition of a farm,[14] in the open country, in Hamilton

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[10] U. S. Census of Agriculture, 1945. Vol. I, Pt. 9, p. 155.

[11] Ranking Agricultural Counties, U. S. Census of Agriculture, 1945. pp. 9, 15, 16-17, 20-21, 26 and 27. The rank in oat *production* is for 1939.

[12] Hagood, Margaret Jarman. Construction of county indexes for measuring change in level of living of farm operator families, 1940-45. Rural Soc. **12:** 139-150. 1947. And, Farm operator family level of living indexes for counties of the U. S., 1940-45. Washington, D. C., USDA, BAE (mimeo) May, 1947.

[13] Wiese, Leopold von, and Becker, Howard. Systematic Sociology, pp. 222-226. John Wiley & Sons, New York. 1932. In a secular social structure, habit and tradition are at a minimum and competitive, rational, pecuniary, means-ends valuations are dominant.

[14] Any tract of 3 or more acres of farm land, or less if its agricultural products for the preceding year were valued at $250 or more. U. S. Census of Agriculture, 1940. Vol. III, p. 22.



Fig. 2. Primary and secondary trade area communities, Hamilton County, Iowa, 1947. (By permission of Paul J. Jehlik and Ray E. Wakeley.)

County, Iowa. Two considerations justify confidence in the representativeness of the sample: (1) It was randomly chosen; and (2) certain sample statistics, closely related to the focus of the study, are in close agreement with parameters estimated from the 1945 Census of Agriculture. One hundred and forty-six farmers or their wives were interviewed on the farm. Only four declined to participate in the study, and no substitutions were made. Data gathered in interviews were supplemented by information from county records.

DEFINITIONS

FAMILISM IN FARMING

Familism in farming is the subordinating of individual interests to those of the family group. Its opposite, indi-

vidualism in farming, is the subordinating of family group interests to those of the individual.[15] In polar, ideal constructs, families and individuals subordinate their interests in farming completely. But in actual families, familism and individualism are a matter of degree because real farm people are mindful of both personal and family interests.

A family is a group of persons united by ties of marriage, blood or adoption, who interact enough to think and act somewhat alike and somewhat differently from other families. The family may include more than one household.[16]

Iowans expect the husband, wife and children at home (the conjugal family) to be the main family unit, although the great family has some importance. Some Chinese reverse this and make the larger (consanguinal) family the most important group, although they recognize the smaller units too.[17]

Others may use the term differently, but in this study the great family designates the large kinship group where the small conjugal unit is the main one. As each child in a conjugal unit matures, migrates, marries, or is regarded as "on his own" financially or occupationally, he is no longer part of his parent's conjugal unit. His parents and siblings then become part of his great family. When one marries he becomes a part of his spouse's great family besides his own.

Familism may be found in every type of family situation. In this investigation familism was examined only within the great family. It was expected that farm operators' tenure circumstances and occupational experience would be associated with the familism of their great families.

SECURITY ON THE LAND

Security on the land, as it is used in this report, means (1) freedom from the threat of eviction from home and farm and (2) the opportunity to manage the farm independently.

Eviction is a real fear among Iowa farm people, for, as many farmers say, "Places are hard to get." Most farm operators in Hamilton County told the interviewer that they preferred farming to other work. Few were specially trained or experienced in nonfarm work. Unless an evicted farm operator can find another farm he may have to sell his livestock and machinery. He loses not only his home but also his occupation, unless he is willing to farm as a hired man.

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[15] Burgess, Ernest W. and Locke, Harvey J. The Family, pp. 64, 527 and 756. American Book Co., New York. 1945.

[16] Burgess and Locke (op. cit.) from whom this definition is adapted, say: The family typically constitutes a single household under one roof. (pp. 7-8.)

[17] Mekeel, H. Scudder, "Preliterate Family Patterns" in Becker and Hill (eds.), Marriage and the Family, pp. 50-51. D. C. Heath and Company, Boston. 1942. Linton, Ralph, The Study of Man, Ch. X. D. Appleton-Century Company, New York. 1936.

How independently a farm operator can manage his farm depends upon how long a time he can plan ahead, and how he and his landlord or mortgagee share farm decisions.

Farm operators vary a great deal in the freedom from the threat of eviction and the independent management that they enjoy. Unencumbered owner-operators of adequate farms are at one extreme; insecure tenants with unfavorable rental arrangements on inadequate farms are at the other. Those between can be distinguished by degrees of encumbrance and conditions of rental.

One may readily observe that Iowa farm families seek not only security on the land, but also maximum profits, increased net worth, leisure time, a high scale of living, and other objectives. Even so, only the achievement of security on the land was studied. Nothing was learned about the other goals. Though a farm owner without a mortgage may have more security on the land than a tenant, he may not be "better off" in other ways.

Security on the land is not the same as social security. The social security embodied in government insurance lessens the hazards of disability, old age, death or unemployment. Security on the land may also remove the farm family farther from the fear of want. But here it means, mainly, a sure place to live and unfettered entrepreneurship, a home and a farm.

Why is the relatively new concept, security on the land, used in this study instead of the familiar, simple division, owners and tenants? Mainly because there are important gradations within both ownership and tenancy that are overlooked in a simple twofold classification. Some of these gradations are used in trying to measure security on the land. Besides, farm ownership often seems to be an end in itself. But for the farmer it usually is a means to other goals. Through farm ownership he may hope to make more money, gain more status in the community, or have more spare time. He may hope to quit moving around or to be more completely his own boss. Only these last two hopes are called security on the land. The gradations of ownership and tenancy have been selected to show degrees of security on the land.

PLAN FOR MEASUREMENT

MEASURING FAMILISM IN FARMING

An index of five factors was used to measure familism in farming. The index showed (1) how much farming relationships and activities that went beyond the conjugal family were kept within the great family, and (2) how much farming was a major value and concern of the great family. It was assumed that where farming activities and relationships are

kept within the great family there is "we-feeling" and subordination of self interest for the sake of the family group. It was assumed that when all members of a great family are devoted to farming, individuals have subordinated their inclinations somewhat to the family norm. Briefly, familism in farming was measured by a maximum of family members engaged in farming and a maximum of farming relationships retained within the family.

The five factors chosen for the index are rooted in theory[18] and in the findings of Parsons and Waples among the families of a low tenancy area in Wisconsin. The five factors are listed below as they would appear in both polar constructs, the familistic and the individualistic great family.

1. *Operator's starting farming through family arrangements.*

A familistic great family will help the younger generation to establish itself. An individualistic family will let children fend for themselves.

2. *Working together of the family in regular farming activities.*

A familistic great family will work with each other all they can, so closely that they hardly seem to have separate farms. Members of an individualistic great family will exchange work with no one, if possible. But if they do share their regular farming activity, they will prefer nonrelatives to relatives in the work exchange.

3. *Siblings' choice of the occupation of farming.*

In its devotion to a common occupation a familistic family is likely to subordinate individual inclinations. The brothers and sisters in an individualistic family will be likely to enter a diversity of occupations.

4. *Continuity of the family on a home farm.*

A strongly familistic group will be determined to keep the home farm family owned and operated. The home place is a rallying point and an emotional center for the entire family. It is "good" to keep the farm in the family. Under no circumstances would they deliberately sell or rent it to a nonfamily member, although they might "lose" it or it may be foreclosed while they are trying to transfer it within the family.

Individualistic family members are likely to be indifferent

[18] Burgess and Locke (op. cit. p. 69) outline the characteristics of an ideal type of familism. See also Arensberg, Conrad, and Kimball, Solon, Family and Community in Ireland, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1940, for a description of familism involving identification of the family with particular land, settling family members on additional farms whenever possible, responsibility of parents for the next generation, and reciprocal aids and work cooperation among kinsmen.

to their association with a particular farm. They will be concerned solely with the farm's utility, if in the construct they care about ownership at all.

5. *Family policy favoring business arrangements and cooperation within the family.*

A familistic family will have a deliberate policy for using capital for family purposes, and a favorable attitude toward business dealings and toward solving farming problems within the great family. The members of an individualistic type of family will believe in the value of independent action in facing farm problems. They will be wary of doing business with relatives and of helping each other.

Each factor measured the performance of a great family, not that of a conjugal unit or an individual farmer. So the factors, being family measures, were quite independent of the age of the farm operator informant.

Both the farm operator's family and his wife's family were considered in measuring the keeping of farming within the great family (factors 1, 2 and 5). Only the operator's great family was considered in measuring the devotion of the great family to farming (factors 3 and 4).

Actual families can be described as nearer one polarity or the other on each of these five factors. A familism score or simple index was computed for each farm operator's great family by adding the number of familistic factors they approximated.

MEASURING SECURITY ON THE LAND

Security on the land varies with the conditions of farm ownership and the terms of tenancy.[19] The unencumbered owner has the most assurance that he can stay where he is. He only has to pay his taxes. The encumbered owner must pay his taxes and meet his mortgage contract; if he does, he too is secure. The tenant, even though he pays his rent and farms well, can only hope that his landlord will be willing to renew the contract. Sometimes an owner with a big mortgage may be more likely to have to move than a renter whose landlord wants him to stay, especially if prices are low or if crops are poor. But in the main, the hazard that tenants face is *different* from that faced by owners whose farms are mortgaged.

Freedom of management also varies with tenure. Clear owners may do much as they please; encumbered owners may be handicapped by their obligations; and tenants must share

[19] The several types of ownership, such as fee simple, life interest, joint ownership or contract purchases, are not distinguished in this investigation. Although each of these distinctions is important for other purposes, encumbrance is regarded here as the principal condition of ownership affecting present security on the land.

many decisions with their landlords, depending upon the rental contract.

The security of the farm operator on the land was closely related to his age. Few of the youngest farm operators owned farms and few of the oldest rented. (See table 1.) To discover the relationships between familism in farming and security on the land the age factor had to be controlled. To hold age constant, farm operators were ranked within each of five age groups into approximately equal "thirds": the most secure third, the middle third, and the least secure third. Though ranking in thirds was admittedly somewhat crude, each farm operator was ranked at least broadly with only others his age.

The way tenure circumstances were classified on a continuum of security on the land is presented in table 1, page 833.

FINDINGS

SECURITY ON THE LAND

More will be said about the assumptions involved in measuring security on the land as the classification of findings in table 1 is explained. In the upper half of the table the tenure circumstances of Hamilton County farmers in 1946 are arrayed. Security on the land becomes less as one moves from one column to the next, from left to right across the caption. In the five rows of the stub, the 146 farm operators in the sample are classified by age. In general, men of every age are found all along the security continuum.

The classification of degrees of security on the land will be described operationally by telling what was done in creating it. Looking at the table at each step may prove helpful to the reader.

1. The operators of adequate farms were divided from those on clearly inadequate farms. The four inadequate farms were homes but they were too small to be farms by local standards. In Hamilton County, men farming much less than 80 acres were regarded as retired or as nonfarmers.

2. Among the operators of adequate farms, owners were separated from tenants.[20]

A landlord can evict his tenant by giving proper notification. He does not have to say why the tenant must move. For this reason, a man who has title to a farm is less likely than a tenant to have to move even though his equity is very small. The nominal owner also has more freedom in operating his farm than does the tenant.

[20] Part owners whose owned portion meets minimum requirements of adequacy were called owners. Three part owners who appear to own mainly homes, not farms, were called tenants.

Conditions in Hamilton County in 1946 justified the separation of owners from tenants. Owner-operators' mortgages were proportionately smaller and were written under more favorable terms than almost ever before. At the same time, tenants' security was jeopardized by the possibility of their farms beng sold. The average age of the landlords in the county in 1946 was 62.6 years. If a landlord dies, his heirs often sell the farm, especially if land prices are high. When many seek farms to rent, having to move can be serious.

A renter commented: "Farms are getting like houses nowadays—you have to buy one in order to be sure of having one."

3. The owner-operators of adequate farms were divided into unencumbered and encumbered owners. One might make more money on a very large farm with a modest mortgage than on a small farm owned clear. But for sheer security on the land he would be safer on the clear farm if it met the minimum requirements of an adequate home and farm. The encumbered owner is more likely to lose all of his security because he faces hazards that the clear owner doesn't.

4. Among unencumbered owners, the owners of 80-acre farms were separated from the owners of farms larger than 80 acres. Only the oldest farmers were affected by this distinction, because only among them did more than a third of the category own their farms clear. With this exception, farm size was avoided as a measure of security beyond the criterion of minimum adequacy. Using farm size in this case as a gradation of security on the land was rationalized on the ground that it affected mainly farm operators over 64 years of age. Most of them had to manage by using someone else's labor and so needed more land than younger operators to meet this extra cost.

5. Some encumbered owner-operators of adequate farms had equities of 76 percent or more of the estimated current value of the farm. They were separated from those whose mortgages left them smaller equities. This division by percentage of equity also separated farmers with large debts from those with small debts, measured in thousands of dollars. This fifth step completed the divisions within the owner category.

6. Tenants on adequate farms were divided into two categories: those who felt confident they could continue to occupy their farms, and those who said they had no idea how long they could stay plus those who knew they must move soon. When asked how long they would remain on the farm then occupied, insecure farmers or their wives often said, "You never know. . . . ." The inflection and seriousness of the reply left little doubt about their anxiety over the uncertainty.

TABLE 1. AGE GROUP OF 146 FARM OPERATORS, HAMILTON COUNTY, IOWA, 1946, CLASSIFIED BY SECURITY ON THE LAND, AND GERRYMANDERED INTO APPROXIMATE THIRDS WITHIN EACH AGE GROUP.

Age group	Adequate farms								Inadequate farms	Total
	Owner-operated				Tenant-operated					
	Unencumbered		Encumbered		Confident of continued occupancy			Insecure		
			Percent clear							
	Over 80 acres	80 acres	76 or more	75 or less	Assured of later title	SC, C or S** lease	LS** (50-50) lease			
21-34	2	0	4	1	2	13	4	7	0	33
35-44	8	0	5	2	1	10	1	12	0	39
45-54	8	1	4	3	2	8	0	3*	1	30
55-64	8	1	7	2	0	4†	1	1‡	2	26
65-86	6	3	3	3	0	2	0	0	1	18

Age group	Most secure "third"	Middle "third"	Least secure "third"	Total
21-34	9	13	11	33
35-44	13	13	13	39
45-54	9	9	12	30
55-64	9	9	8	26
65-86	6	6	6	18
Total	46	50	50	146

* one also owns 40 acres
† one also owns 46 acres
‡ also owns 26 acres
** SC, share-cash; C, cash; S, share; LS, livestock-share.

Independent management through long-term planning is highly associated with assurance of continued occupancy.

Tenants' statements were used as data. The length of a formal rental contract would have been a more objective criterion of security. It could not be used because in more than half of the tenancies there was no written contract, and only four tenants had written contracts made for longer than 1 year at a time.

Thanks to family affection and community opinion, related tenants, on the whole, are less likely to have to move than unrelated tenants. But security on the land could hardly be defined in terms of kinship alone.

7. To come closer to an exact "third" in the youngest age group, tenants positively assured of later title to a farm were specially classified. A tenant who has assurance of later title has more freedom to manage and to make improvements than other tenants.

8. Among the remaining tenants who felt confident they could continue to occupy their farms, those with livestock-share leases were separated from those with share, cash, or crop-share-cash leases. If landlord and tenant share the ownership of implements and livestock, as in the livestock lease, they must divide the movable farm capital if the tenant moves. The tenant may lose his operatorship in the division. So under the livestock-share lease, eviction is a double threat. Furthermore, in Hamilton County tenants on a livestock-share lease were customarily allowed less independent management than tenants with other leases.[21]

The bottom part of table 1 shows how many farm operators were in each "third" within each age group. The thirds aren't far from being evenly divided, anywhere in the table. The heavy, gerrymandering lines indicate the cells which comprise the "thirds." The same tenure circumstances which ranked a young farm operator in the most secure third compared with other young men placed a very old farm operator in the least secure third of his age group. Through the classification of table 1 the influence of age as a factor in achieving security on the land was not entirely eliminated, but it was greatly reduced.

The details of this classification cannot be applied in an

[21] A woman and her husband had long rented an excellent farm from her father on a 50-50 (livestock-share) lease. She said, "Don't ever recommend it!" A middle-aged farmer described his beginning as a farm operator: "My first 5 years, on a 50-50 lease, were worse than working for monthly wages. I will starve before I will rent 50-50 again!" The same outlook, from the other viewpoint, was expressed by a young farm operator: "(In order) To retire from active work myself someday but still run the place I would like to have a married hired man or a tenant on a 50-50 lease, it wouldn't matter much which . . . . . ."

This discussion of the livestock-share lease is intended to evaluate its merits and shortcomings only with reference to security on the land.

area where tenure customs and conditions aren't like those in Hamilton County. Its assumptions are based on local judgments and conditions in 1946. The basic idea, ranking farm operators on a continuum within age groups, can be used anywhere, anytime.

FAMILISM IN FARMING

OPERATOR'S STARTING FARMING THROUGH FAMILY ARRANGEMENTS

To become a farm operator in Hamilton County is difficult. One needs a farm, machinery, power and livestock, as well as subsistence, seed and feed for the first year. If the farmer marries in the same year, as 67 of 146 did, the couple must also set up a new household. Depending upon the times, simultaneous costs total from several hundred dollars to several thousand. As may be seen in table 2 few begin without credit or assistance.

The majority of the farm operators started largely through great family arrangements. Some succeeded the father on the home farm; some received gifts or inheritances. Some used family credit, and some of them gradually built up at home. A typical answer was, "I eased onto it from home."

This first factor was supposed to measure the family's willingness to aid beginners instead of its ability to aid them. So the proportion of the operator's start that was worked out within the great family, instead of the size of the gifts he received, was the measure.

TABLE 2. PROPORTION OF GREAT FAMILY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE FARM OPERATOR'S START.

Extent of family in start	Number of cases	Percent
Almost completely	75	51*
More than half	24	17
Half or less	22	15
Little or none	25	17
Total	146	100

* The percentages in this table and the tables to follow are based on sample data. They are subject to sampling errors. To learn more about how well these percentages probably represent Hamilton County in 1946, see the standard errors arrayed in appendix table B, page 870.

WORKING TOGETHER OF THE FAMILY IN REGULAR FARMING ACTIVITY

Two or more great family members often worked in the same farm operatorship as partners, for wages, or as unpaid family workers. Sometimes they partly merged operatorships; two or more farms were run, in some ways, as if they were a single farm. Another family arrangement was simply the

TABLE 3. WORKING TOGETHER OF THE GREAT FAMILY IN THE REGULAR FARMING ACTIVITIES OF 146 FARM OPERATORS, HAMILTON COUNTY, IOWA, 1946.

Working arrangements	Number of cases	Percent
Within a farm		
Partnerships	10	7
Unpaid family workers beyond school age, or employees who are relatives	26	18
Partially merging farm operatorships		
"Working with" related farm operators	13	9
Between separate farms		
Work exchange almost exclusively with relatives	12	8
Work exchange more with relatives than with nonrelatives	11	7
Work exchange about as much with nonrelatives as with relatives	20	14
Work exchange more with nonrelatives than with relatives	10	7
Work exchange almost solely with nonrelatives, or with no one	44	30
Total	146	100

exchanging of work between separate farm operators who were relatives. The complaint of one farm couple shows the importance of family work arrangements: "We have no relatives who have anything like a combine or cornpicker so we have to wait on strangers or pick by hand."

The difference between the partial merging of farms known locally as "working together" and the work exchange familiar to rural sociologists is a difference in degree only. Farmers who "work together" have more of a common plan of work; they don't just trade surplus time. They share more types of work. They more often use and own machinery jointly. And their relationship is likely to last longer than ordinary work exchange. They may also prize "working together" for its social value, quite aside from its economic advantage.[22]

SIBLINGS' CHOICE OF THE OCCUPATION OF FARMING

When asked what their brothers and sisters are doing, many Hamilton County farmers can truthfully say, "They're

[22] "Working together," like work exchange, employment or partnerships, existed in Iowa between nonrelatives, even though in the sample "working together" and partnerships were found only within great families.

Another usage of the term "together" seemed to be limited to the great family. For example, it was said of a father that "he has his boy with him" quite irrespective of the details of the arrangements involved. The term covered unpaid family work, wage work, numerous leases, "working together," and partnerships. It applied especially to fathers and sons, regardless of whether the son was single or married. This loose usage of the word by farm people probably points to the importance of the family mutuality and the relative unimportance of the various possible conditions for the arrangement.

TABLE 4. PROPORTION OF OPERATOR'S SIBLINGS WHO ARE FARMING.*

Percent of siblings	Number of cases	Percent
82 - 100	74	51
66 - 81	18	12
35 - 65	34	23
34 and under	20	14
Total	146	100

* Not included in the calculation of percentages are immature siblings not yet out of school, young men in the armed forces, unmarried girls, and men who would like to farm but are physically unable. Married sisters are classified according to their husbands' occupations.

all farmers." In still other great families, most of the siblings farm. Probably some families that used to farm have left farming completely. But if no sibling farmed in 1946, that family would not be represented in the study because the information was gathered from farm operators only.

CONTINUITY OF THE FAMILY ON A HOME FARM

The fourth factor measured the father's wealth somewhat, as well as familistic continuity, because a family that continues on a home farm is likely to own a farm. The tendency to measure family wealth was lessened in several

TABLE 5. FAMILY CONTINUITY ON A HOME FARM.

Circumstance on home farm	Farm operators' families	Percent
Transferred between generations	47	32
Lost* in attempted transfer	3	2
Still owned by purchaser and operated by a family member	29	20
Lost* by generation previous to informant	14	10
Never had been a home farm due to operator's nonfarm background or being an immigrant, etc.	11	8
Never had been a home farm though the family farmed	18	12
Estate or operator's sibling sold home place	16	11
Parent of operator sold the home place	5	3
Home place still family owned but not family operated	3	2
Total	146	100

*Farm was foreclosed, or was deeded to mortgagee to avoid foreclosure.

ways. The size of the home farms was ignored. A mortgage lowers the value of a farm, but continuity on a mortgaged home farm was put on a par with continuity on a clear home place. If a family tried to transfer the farm to a relative and lost it in the attempt, the effort was counted fully as continuity. A family's owning a home farm did not guarantee their continuity on it. Even though one or more siblings were farming in every family, sometimes valuable home farms were sold or rented to "strangers."

FAMILY POLICY FAVORING BUSINESS ARRANGEMENTS AND COOPERATION WITHIN THE FAMILY

This fifth factor included attitudes toward tenure arrangements such as renting, buying or selling, lending, borrowing and cosigning among relatives. It covered the cooperative ownership of machinery, equipment or breeding stock; and the buying and selling of other kinds of property than real estate within the great family. Family policies varied widely.

Most of the farmers weren't asked outright about their family policies. All relevant comments that they volunteered were faithfully recorded. One attitude may be seen in the statement, ". . . . then if you have to repair it, it stays in the family and it is better that way." Another farmer expressed the opposite attitude. "I always remember what the bum told me: 'Don't deal with relatives!' "

TABLE 6. FAMILY POLICY CONCERNING INTRAFAMILY BUSINESS ARRANGEMENTS AND FAMILY COOPERATION.

Policy or attitude	Number of cases	Percent
Favorable policy or attitude expressed	44	30
Favorable policy or attitude less strong, but apparent	32	22
Favorable policy or attitude neither apparent nor expressed	55	38
Unfavorable attitude expressed	15	10
Total	146	100

THE SIMPLE INDEX OF FAMILISM IN FARMING

Each of the five factors was divided into a familistic and a nonfamilistic part. The divisions could have been made so that on each factor the 146 farmers' families would be divided about evenly—about as many familistic as nonfamilistic. Instead the divisions were made at points that seemed to correspond with the logic of familism, no matter how many families that caused to be labeled familistic or nonfamilistic. The division points were as follows: (1) Ninety-nine farm

TABLE 7. INDEX OF FAMILISM IN FARMING OF FARM OPERATORS IN HAMILTON COUNTY.

Index (factors of familism present)	Frequency (families)	Percent
5	21	14
4	32	22
3	36	25
2	27	18
1	19	13
0	11	8
Total	146	100

operators got their start through arrangements that involved family members more than nonrelatives. They were separated from 47 who obtained less help from their families. (2) Seventy-two farmers included two or more great family members in their farm operatorship; or they partly merged operatorships; or they exchanged work within the great family more than with nonrelatives. They were separated from 74 whose work exchange, if any, was with nonrelatives as much or more than it was within the great family. (3) Seventy-four farm operators whose siblings all were farmers or almost all were farmers were separated from 72 operators who had siblings not farming. (4) In 93 families the home place had been transferred within the family, was still possessed by a first family owner, or had been involuntarily lost. They were separated from 53 families that had never had a home place or had voluntarily sold or rented it to nonfamily persons. (5) Seventy-six families expressed or showed a favorable attitude toward business arrangements and cooperation within the family. Seventy others were indifferent or opposed to such attitudes or policies.

A simple index was devised by adding the number of times a farm operator's great family scored on the familistic side of these five divisions. The index could go as low as 0 and as high as 5. Some families scored 0, more scored 5, and some fell on every index number between. Judged by this index familism was more prominent in Hamilton County farming in 1946 than was individualism.

This index was used to investigate the relationship between familism in farming and other variables.

ANALYSIS: FAMILISM IN FARMING AND SECURITY ON THE LAND

THE CENTRAL PROBLEM

There is a real association between farm operators' se-

curity on the land and the familism in farming of their great families, but the relationship is not close. This conclusion is supported by the evidence of total linear correlation. The coefficient of correlation between familism in farming, measured by the simple index, 0 to 5, and the ranked thirds of security on the land was $r = .21$, just significant at the 1 percent level.[23]

Three other quantitative tests made different assumptions about the data. They yielded somewhat lower significance levels.[24]

The *most secure* farm operators seemed definitely to come from the *most familistic* great families. Familism didn't seem to be so important to achieving only medium security. In other words, there seemed to be very little more familism in the medium security third than there was in the lowest security third, but at the top level of security familism showed up strongly.

In total linear regression each of the five factors in the simple index of familism in farming counted as much as every other. Familism in farming was the variable; the five factors were attributes of the variable, present or absent. By disregarding the concept, familism in farming, the five factors were taken as five variables acting independently of one another in a multiple regression equation to predict security on the land. Three categories of security on the land were used, and the five familism-in-farming variables were divided into two parts, as before.

The five factors acting separately as variables predicted security on the land no better than did the simple index of familism in farming. The additional estimate of variance was not a significant improvement when the additional degrees of freedom were taken into account.[25]

Of the five factors, (1) the operator's starting farming through family arrangements, and (4) continuity of the family on a home farm yielded the most prediction. They were followed closely by (5) family policy favoring business arrangements and cooperation within the family. Siblings' choice of the occupation of farming (3) was less useful, and (2) the working together of the family in regular farming activity was of little value for predicting security on the land, taken by itself. The contribution of each factor to the

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[23] Snedecor, George W. Statistical Methods. p. 149. The Iowa State College Press, Ames, Iowa. 1946.

[24] Rohwer, Robert A. Familism in Farming and Security on the Land. Ch. IV. Unpublished thesis. Library, the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. 1948.

[25] See appendix table C.

TABLE 8. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURITY ON THE LAND AND FAMILISM IN FARMING BY AGE GROUPS.

Age group	Frequency N	Correlation	
		Coefficient found	Coefficient at 5% level*
21-34 years	33	.22	.35
35-44 years	39	.54	.32
45-54 years	30	.05	.36
55-64 years	26	—.05	.39
65-86 years	18	.43	.47
All ages	146	.21	.16

* Snedecor, op. cit., pp. 149 or 351.

prediction of security on the land is of course no test of its validity as an index of familism in farming.

The relationship between security on the land and familism in farming varied by age groups.

A real association was found for the entire sample in spite of almost no relationship in the age groups 45 to 64 years.

The effects of the business cycle can be seen in the variation by age groups. Age was held constant in the original classification of security on the land, and familism in farming was not significantly associated with age.[26] So the variation found among groups probably shows the changing relationship between the two variables with the passing of time. Men 45 to 64 years of age in 1946 were beginning or expanding in the period of the 1920 land boom and the agricultural depression that followed. A major boom and bust appears to be too much for familism in farming. More definite conclusions can't be drawn because frequencies are small when the sample is divided into age groups.

Individual cases show some of the reasons why only a low association between familism in farming and security on the land was found for the whole county. Without help from their great families, some of the least secure of the very youngest farm operators would not have been operators at all in 1946. The business cycle sometimes spoiled familistic efforts to achieve security. The fortunes of farmers 55 to 64 years of age especially showed the effect of price fluctuations. A few operators with low familism were very secure on the land because they entered farming late in life bringing savings from nonfarm work. Occasionally highly familistic, related tenants delayed buying because they were likely to

[26] The chi-square test yielded a significance level, $p = <.80$.

inherit a farm. Rarely, the index of familism seemed not to fit peculiar circumstances.[27] A few operators high in familism but low in security had suffered illness or misfortune so great that without family help they would have had to quit farming. Their cases suggested that some others with less familism were forced completely out of farming by reverses. Often there seemed simply to be little relationship between familism and security, for no inaccuracy of measurement could be found.

Men who had been forced to quit farming were not interviewed. If they had been included, the analysis might have shown a closer relationship between familism in farming and security on the land. As measured, there was more familism than individualism in the whole sample. A number of operators with familistic kinfolk had only low security. But few operators from individualistic families had high security on the land. Finding familism in farming widespread among all the farmers, the small number of individualists who achieved highest security and the logic of particular cases suggest that the individualistic are more likely to be pushed completely out of farming.

All evidence—the total correlation, the multiple regression, the observation that the *most familistic* and the *most secure* are closely related, the analysis by age groups, and the consideration of individual cases within age groups—affirms the central hypothesis. Hamilton County, Iowa, in 1946 was an area of prosperous commercial agriculture. The security on the land of its farm operators was significantly associated with the familism in farming of their great families. Although this is true, it is apparent that other important factors are also associated with security on the land.

COMPONENTS OF SECURITY ON THE LAND

Assurance of continued occupancy, freedom of management, and ownership as contrasted with tenancy, are components of security on the land. None of these tenure circumstances, considered separately without holding age constant, is significantly associated with familism in farming.[28] The evidence summarized in table 9 failed to show

[27] For example, one man whose farm had been absentee-owned for 70 years by his father and his grandfather, owed his start in farming wholly to his family and received his clear ownership as a gift. Yet due to his nonfarm background and paucity of kin, his familism score was low.

[28] In the remainder of this section and in the following section the relationship between familism in farming and the several dependent variables was measured by the coefficient of contingency, with the simple index as a principle of classification for familism. Chi-square was used to learn the likelihood that a real association existed in the universe from which the sample was drawn.

TABLE 9. ASSOCIATION BETWEEN FAMILISM IN FARMING AND DETAILED, PRESENT TENURE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Operator's present tenure circumstances (dependent variable)	No. of cases* N	No. of categories		Significance level p =	Contingency coefficient†
		Dep. var.	Familism		
1. Assurance of continued occupancy, this farm (both part owners and tenants)	88	2	4	<.10	.27
2. Assurance of continued occupancy, this farm (tenants only)	69	2	4	<.20	.28
3. Freedom of management (tenants only)	72	2	5	<.70	.19
4. Farm owner or tenant	146	2	5	<.50	.16
5. Size of farm operation	146	3	5	<.20	.28
6. Size of farm owned .	77	3	3	<.01	.41

* The number of cases varies among the tests because some of the hypotheses apply only to certain portions of the sample, or because information is not available for an occasional farm operator.

† Due to the relative lowness of most of the associations, the correction of the coefficients of contingency for broad grouping would raise them only slightly and therefore is not made.

that the most familistic were more sure than others that they would continue to occupy the farms they operated; that they enjoyed the greatest freedom of management; or that they most often owned farms.

Neither did the most familistic in their farming operate the largest acreages. Among farm owners, the most familistic did own more than their share of the largest farms.[29]

OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY

The expectation that landless laborers will in a single lifetime become land proprietors has dominated American thinking about land tenure.[30] People often assume that most farmers can and do climb the agricultural ladder. But the occupational histories of many farmers show that they do not move steadily up the ladder. Some skip rungs. Some slide back. Others stay on certain rungs a very long time. Some never finish the climb. Erratic movement on the ladder may

[29] It may be, of course, that possessing something to share, such as a large farm, is conducive to familism. Association is not causal sequence.

[30] Wehrwein, George S. The problem of inheritance in American land tenure. Journal of Farm Economics, 9: 163. 1927.

be seen in the following facts concerning the 146 farm operators in our sample:[31]

Fifteen started as an operator more than once. They failed or quit the first time.

Twelve former owners slipped back to tenancy. Ten of the 12 were foreclosed on or deeded to avoid foreclosure. Seven of the 12 bought again; five were still renting in 1946.

Eleven of the 146 farm operators interviewed had never been tenants. They began as operators and took title to a farm at the same time. On the other extreme, 14 farm operators had been tenants continuously for periods ranging from 18 to 45 years when interviewed in 1946.

Nine of the 43 owners of unencumbered farms had never given a mortgage on their farm real estate. By contrast, 10 owners of encumbered farms, all of them 59 years of age or older, had carried their mortgages for periods ranging from 20 to 40 years without removing them.

Three-fifths of the farm operators in the sample had never been hired men.[32] Only one in six had been a hired man for longer than 5 years. Two-thirds of the farm operators had never done nonfarm work.[33] Only one in 10 had done nonfarm work for more than 5 years. More than half had never spent a full year in either nonfarm work or farm wage work.

Few farmers first began as operators before they were legally of age. The majority of farmers began as operators in their twenties, with almost as many beginning in their late

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[31] A bar chart showing each farmer's occupational history in a separate bar most adequately presents the patterns of experience of individual farm operators. The 146 occupational histories described here are arrayed by age on a grid permitting calendar comparisons in a colored bar chart in the writer's unpublished thesis, "Familism in Farming and Security on the Land," 1948, available from the library of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. Nine types of experiences are shown. J. L. Charlton's fig. 2 in Social Aspects of Farm Ownership and Tenancy in the Arkansas Ozarks, Ark. Agr. Exp. Sta., Bul. 471, September, 1947, p. 16, is similar. However, such charts are limited to relatively small numbers of cases and do not summarize. Calculating the *average* time spent in each tenure category by a number of farmers obliterates individual sequences and incorrectly implies that everyone experiences each rung of the ladder. Those who present the combinations or sequences of steps used by a number of farmers usually neglect the time element. How best to present data concerning occupational history is a problem that requires further work.

[32] A year as a hired man was defined as a calendar year, after age 14, in which most of the farming season was spent in farm wage work. Some farmers left home before age 14 but this minimum was set for the beginning of occupational experience. Being principally occupied on the home farm and working for neighbors when not needed at home, as frequently was the case, was classified as being on the home farm. Except in a few cases of married sons, receiving wages from one's father was not counted as experience as a hired man, although wage work for other relatives was. The more familistic, of course, more often were employed by relatives. Most of the farmers reported receiving no set wages while on the home farm, even after reaching age 21, so that redefining hired man's status to include wage work for the father would have changed the finding little.

[33] A year of nonfarm work was defined as a calendar year in which most of the farming season was spent in nonfarm work, either self-employment or wage work. The nonfarm work that many farmers have done in the winter does not qualify. A miscellaneous category, including being in the army, a student, sick, travelling or unemployed, was disregarded as off-farm experience.

twenties as began in their early twenties. One farmer in four first began as a farm operator when he was 30 years of age or older.

Of the men who did not begin as farm operators until they were 30 years of age or older, one in four began as an operator directly from home. His late start resulted from staying at home to an advanced age. The others spent a relatively long time as hired men, in nonfarm work, or both.

Of the 81 farmers who ever owned a farm, two-fifths (34) first owned before they were 35 years old. Nearly one-fourth (19) became owners between the ages of 35 and 44 years; and more than a third (28) did not become farm owners until they were 45 years old or older.

No "typical" occupational history is evident. Farmers have used varying numbers of steps, and they have taken the steps in different orders. The time spent by individuals on each rung of the ladder they use varies widely. The agricultural ladder describes the hopes of Hamilton County farmers in 1946 and outlines what most of them are trying to do. But few farmers have gone up the ladder one step at a time at fairly regular time intervals.

ANALYSIS: FAMILISM IN FARMING AND OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY

Past security on the land can be seen in farmers' occupational history. To expect that the most familistic in their farming would have been most stable in their occupation and location simply extends the logic of the central problem.

To answer the general question, "Does familism in farming appear to affect the occupational histories of farmers?" several more specific questions were asked and answered. They will be apparent as the findings are discussed.

The findings discussed in this section are summarized in table 10. Each dependent variable listed in table 10 is related to the independent variable: the farm operators whose great families are the most familistic in their farming.

The first seven tests in table 10 will be recognized as the occupational experience of farmers known as the agricultural ladder. They are the most consistently significant associations with familism in farming found in the study.

EXPERIENCE AS A HIRED MAN

The most familistic in their farming spent the fewest years as a hired man. More of them spent no time as a hired man, and those who had been hired men spent shorter periods in farm wage work than did the less familistic.

The familism scores of a few farm operators reflected the familism of the wife's great family more than their own. Since more farm wage work occurred before marriage than

TABLE 10. ASSOCIATION BETWEEN FAMILISM IN FARMING AND SELECTED ASPECTS OF OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY AND MOBILITY.

Operator's experience (dependent variable)	No. of cases* N	No. of categories		Significance level p =	Contingency coefficient†
		Dep. var.	Familism		
1. Years spent as a hired man	145	3	3	<.001	.37
2. Years spent in nonfarm work	145	3	3	<.01	.32
3. Years spent in both nonfarm work and hired man's status	145	3	5	<.001	.41
4. Years at home without operatorship	145	3	3	<.05	.25
5. Age first became a farm operator	146	3	5	<.20	.27
6. Age first became a farm owner	81	3	3	<.30	.26
7. Age became an unencumbered owner	43	2	3	<.02	.35
8. Years spent on farm now occupied	146	3	5	<.01	.36
9. Nearness to birth place	146	4	5	<.01	.45
10. Years as operator on farm now occupied	146	4	5	<.01	.39
11. Years as operator on this farm (age held constant)	146	3	5	<.30	.26
12. Average length of tenancies	134	3	5	<.10	.31
13. Number of tenancies	144	3	5	<.80	.18

* The number of cases varies among the tests because some of the hypotheses apply only to certain portions of the sample, or because information is not available for an occasional farm operator.

† Due to the relative lowness of most of the associations the correction of the coefficients of contingency for broad grouping would raise them only slightly and therefore is not made.

after, the true relationship between familism and farm wage work was minimized somewhat by permitting the familism of the wife's family to affect the index.

Typically the most familistic started as operators and often employed others without working a full year as farm wage earners themselves.

EXPERIENCE IN NONFARM WORK

The most familistic in their farming spent the fewest years in nonfarm work. They were more likely than the less familistic never to have left farming. If they did leave farming they returned sooner.

Like work as a hired man, nonfarm work usually was experienced before marriage, if at all. So familism scores attributable to the wife's family again minimized the true relationship somewhat.

The most familistic rarely left farming at all.

EXPERIENCE IN BOTH NONFARM WORK AND AS A HIRED MAN

The most familistic in their farming spent the fewest years in either hired man's status, nonfarm work, or both. Since this generalization combined the two previous propositions, a highly significant association was expected and found. The same qualifications apply concerning the measurement of familism in terms of the wife's family.

YEARS ON THE HOME FARM

The most familistic in their farming spent the most years on the home farm without the status of farm operators.[34]

The family cooperators most often went directly from the home farm to independent operatorship. Family aid in starting as an operator and the operator's having worked on the home farm were often the two parts of a familistic pattern of action.

The simple index may not have shown the full willingness of broken families and poor families to behave familistically in their farming. If so, part of the association between familism and years on the home farm may be spurious.

EARLY OPERATORSHIP

The most familistic were expected to become farm operators at the youngest ages, but the evidence from the sample does not show that they did. Some alternative explanations, suggested by cases, might make hypotheses for further study.

Operators from individualistic families do more farm wage work and nonfarm work. But they may leave home enough earlier to make up for it.

Helping relatives delays the start of some young men from familistic families. Two men, extreme cases, stayed with their parents until age 34 vainly trying to avoid foreclosure on the home farm. Familism in farming is a two-way process. It involves both giving and receiving help. Sometimes one family member's gain is another's loss.

A young man who is quite sure that his family will some day help him to start as a farm operator may not be so impatient to begin at an early age. He may even know that later his family will provide him with a farm to own. An extreme example of this was an only child who farmed with his father until age 42, long after he had married, without any understanding concerning ownership. Four other only sons approximated this case.

Sometimes great families take a lot for granted and don't talk things over. If they never talk about it, a son may wait

[34] This may suggest to the reader that the most familistic in their farming may also neglect formal education. No evidence from this sample indicates that they do. Rohwer, op. cit., Appendix C, pp. 160-161.

longer than he thought he would need to for help from his father. Some fathers who have never told their sons what help in getting started they could expect, are bewildered when the sons decide not to farm at all. If neither father nor son will bring up the subject of the boy's starting for himself, the young man may be delayed.

EARLY OWNERSHIP

This study does not show that the familistic in their farming buy farms at younger ages than the less familistic.

A reasonable alternative hypothesis may account for this failure.

The more familistic great families of the area do feel an obligation to help young farmers start for themselves sooner or later, even though the familistic could not be shown to start as operators earliest. But Hamilton County farmers do not think it is the great family's obligation to help toward buying a farm early in life. The same sense of obligation does not necessarily carry over from operatorship to ownership.

This alternative explanation is supported by the facts concerning related tenancy, which clearly is a function of familism.[35] Related tenancy may get an operator started but it may also delay his ownership. Some related tenants were already grandparents, old enough to think of their own retirement. Their landlord parents didn't want to jeopardize their own security for old age by selling their farms, for who can predict how long he will live? To be sure, families in other areas[36] and a few families here have found methods to provide for both early ownership by the young and perpetual income for the old, but such arrangements were not the norm here.

In the Hamilton County sample of 146 operators, there were 31 related tenants. Seventeen of them rented from the operator's parents, five from the wife's and nine from other relatives. Of the 22 tenants renting from parents or parents-in-law, two were over 50 years of age, and six more were over 40. Several of the tenancies had already lasted from 13 to 26 years. Related tenants probably needed to fear eviction less often than unrelated tenants, but some related tenants seemed to take title to a farm later in life than other farmers their age.

Three related tenants met the problem of delayed ownership by buying farms from nonrelatives. They continued to

[35] With five categories of familism and the dichotomy related and unrelated tenants, $N = 76$, $C = .40$, $p = < .01$.

[36] Parsons and Waples, op. cit.

rent from their parents and rented out their own farms to others. There is evidence that at least two owner-operators coerced their father-landlords into selling by threatening to move. The community would censure a father who let a nonrelative follow his only son as tenant on the family farm.

Related tenancy often means long and late tenancy, and perhaps it delays ownership among the familistic.

EARLY UNENCUMBERED OWNERSHIP

The most familistic in their farming cleared their farms of encumbrance at younger ages than did others. There are only 43 unencumbered owners in the sample. This finding is almost highly significant statistically ($C = .35$; $p = < .02$), but final judgment should be withheld until more data are available.

One might think that the familistic paid off their mortgages first because they inherited more of their equities. The facts are that acquiring one's farm within the great family is closely associated with familism in farming.[37] But most farm owners had to pay for all or almost all of their equities. Even though a farm title was transferred within a family, the new owner usually had to pay for most of the farm's value to buy out coheirs and to pay off previous mortgages.

The war years appear to be very important for clear ownership. In table D, appendix B, 76 owned farms are classified by the year they were bought and the year they were cleared, or if still mortgaged, by the proportion of equity still owed. The biggest payments seem to have been made during the war years. Perhaps the more familistic happened to be in a better position to clear their titles at this time.

The most familistic probably burned their mortgages at younger ages, but the judgment requires reservations.

STABLE LOCATION—RESIDENCE

The most familistic in their farming had spent the most years on the farm they occupied when interviewed. The years before operatorship were included. Of the 53 farm operators with highest familism scores, 40 percent had spent all of their lives on the farm they occupied in 1946; of the 57 with the lowest scores, 5 percent. Operators who lived their lives on one farm usually followed a relative on it. Continuity of the family on a home farm was part of the index of familism. These facts may account for part of the association found. However, some family member besides the operator interviewed could be the one who provided the family's continuity

[37] With five categories of familism and transfers classified within and without the family, $N = 70$, $C = .43$, $p = < .01$.

on a home farm. An operator would not need to be on a family farm for his great family to have a maximum score. So some of the association between an operator's stable residence and his great family's familism probably is spurious, but not as much as one would first think.

The most familistic in their farming were nearest to the place of their birth.[38] This measure of stable location may overstate the relationship a bit, if distance from one's kinfolk makes it somewhat harder to accumulate a high familism score.

STABLE LOCATION—FARM OPERATORSHIP

The most familistic had spent the most years as operators on the farms where they were located, if operators of all ages were considered together. But with age held relatively constant, by the method used for classifying security on the land, it is not certain that the most familistic have enjoyed the most stability of operatorship.[39]

Fifteen of 45 unrelated tenants were in more than their ninth year on the same farm. Of these three were in their 18th year, one in his 22nd, and two in their 28th and 29th years. These facts suggest why the test in which the age factor is controlled proved nonsignificant. How old a young man was when he started farming for himself, and how old an elderly man was when he bought a farm will affect how long he has been on the farm where the interviewer finds him. Neither age at starting farming nor age at buying a farm was significantly associated with familism. These facts may help explain why the familistic seem to have had little or no advantage in stable operatorship.

TENANCY, NUMBER AND AVERAGE LENGTH

Some of the farmers in the sample had moved from farm to farm quite a few times. But the conclusion that the most familistic in their farming have lived on fewer farms per man as tenants is not warranted at all. Nor could it be shown that the most familistic had enjoyed longer tenancies on the average than the less familistic. The present tenancy was included for men renting in 1946, even though it was not completed.

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[38] See appendix B, table E.

[39] The length of operatorship with age not held constant was noted because the longer a farmer has operated a given farm the more familiar with it he is, regardless of his age, and familiarity is sometimes valued. On the other hand, 10 years on the same farm denotes far more stable operatorship for a man under 35 years of age than it does for a man of 60 years. So the relationship between familism and length of operatorship was also ascertained with age held constant.

SUMMARY CONCERNING OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY

The farm operators whose great families were most familistic in their farming enjoyed the most stability of occupation and the most stable residence. They spent fewer years as hired men or in nonfarm work or both, and left home latest. They should have had the greatest familiarity with the farms they occupied and the communities where they lived, for they had spent the most years on their present farms and were the nearest to their place of birth.

The most familistic enjoyed the most stable location in terms of farm operatorship only if age is not held constant. They had not begun as operators at younger ages. Their period of occupying their present farms as operators, the number of their tenancies or the average length of their tenancies was not significantly different from the less familistic.

ANALYSIS: OTHER FAMILY FACTORS AND SECURITY ON THE LAND

It was thought that other characteristics of the great family besides familism in farming might be associated with security on the land. Behavior within the conjugal family unit, as well as in the great family, might be important. These expectations were part of the over-all hypothesis that the behavior of family groups is associated with security in agriculture.

TABLE 11. ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SELECTED FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS AND SECURITY ON THE LAND.

Selected family characteristic (independent variable)	No. of cases* N	Categories		Significance level p =	Contingency coefficient†
		Ind. var.	Sec. land		
Kinship in tenure					
Tenancy within the family	76	2	3	<.01	.34
Transfer within the family of owner-operated farm	70	2	3	<.20	.23
Familism in sociability					
Exchanging meals and visiting within the family	146	4	3	<.70	.17
Interaction in conjugal family					
Sharing responsibilities	134	3	3	<.50	.16
Sharing work tasks	136	4	3	<.30	.24
Family composition					
Number of siblings	146	4	3	<.95	.11
Number of brothers	146	2	3	<.30	.13
Ethnicity					
National origin of operator	145	5	3	<.90	.16
Church preference of operator	142	4	3	<.90	.13
Family affluence in farming					
Farm ownership by parents of operator and/or wife	140	3	3	<.10	.23

*† See footnotes to table 10, p. 846.

The specific questions asked and answered in this section may be inferred by looking at table 11. The dependent variable for each of the independent variables listed in table 11 is security on the land. It was measured by the same classification of ranked thirds within age groups developed for the central problem.

KINSHIP IN TENURE

Related tenancy is the most familiar index of kinship in tenure problems. Among owner-operators its counterpart is the family relationship between seller and buyer or grantor and grantee.[40] Related tenants throughout the county had more security on the land than did unrelated tenants. Whether a tenant was assured of being able to stay on his farm was one of the principles for classifying security on the land. It is not surprising, then, to find that related tenants were most confident of being able to remain where they were.[41]

Indeed, one wonders more why the association between kinship in tenancy and security on the land was not higher ($C = .34$). Two facts are submitted. (1) Security on the land is not alone a measure of whether the tenant might or might not stay on the farm where he was. It measured mainly how his present tenure circumstance compared with other men his age, at least some of whom were owner-operators. (2) Harmony between relatives is not universal. Said one tenant of his sister-landlady, "She threatens to put me off every year."

It was hypothesized that owner-operators who had acquired their farms by transfers within the family had greater security on the land than did owner-operators who purchased from nonrelatives. Our test revealed no significant association between family transfers and security on the land.

Though both related tenancy and transfer within the family were associated with familism in farming, related tenancy was definitely associated with security on the land, while having acquired one's farm from a family member was not.

FAMILISM IN SOCIABILITY, NOT IN FARMING

If familism is defined as the subordination of individual inclinations to the interest of the family group, it can be

[40] Kinship in tenancy is moderately and significantly associated with familism in farming ($C = .40$, $p = <.01$). Kinship in the transfer to an owner-operator is also moderately and significantly associated with familism in farming ($C = .43$, $p = <.01$).

[41] A further indication of the confidence between tenant and landlord is whether the lease was oral or written. This index, too, shows greatest confidence existing among the tenure situations within families. Oral leases were most numerous among related tenants. ($C = .35$ and $p = <.001$.) The relationship between familism in farming and oral-written leases is $C = .35$ and $p = <.02$. Not all operators from familistic families rented from relatives.

found in many activities besides farming. Familism in sociability was measured through two activities: confining hospitality at meals to the great family and keeping the exchange of social visits within the great family. Four fairly distinct patterns were found. They ranged from sociability dominated by the great family to sociability dominated by nonkin.[42]

A farm operator's security on the land was not associated with the familism in sociability of his great family. Nor was it associated with the extent that they exchanged meals only with each other, taken as a separate factor ($C = .18$; $p = < .70$). His security on the land also did not vary much with the extent that his great family carried on social visiting only among themselves ($C = .20$; $p = < .50$).

Patterns of sociability were independent of familism in farming.[43] Familistic sociability was not associated with security on the land.

INTERACTION IN THE CONJUGAL UNIT

The relationship between a farm operator and his wife might affect their security on the land. The sharing of responsibilities and the sharing of work tasks between the marriage pair were investigated. Neither was significantly related to security on the land.

SHARING OF RESPONSIBILITIES

Whether a farm operator's wife helped him make major decisions about his farming, and how much she wrote checks[44] were the measure of their sharing responsibilities. The combined measure was not significantly related to security on the land. Neither was either of its two component factors, check writing or decision making, taken separately.[45]

SHARING OF WORK TASKS

How much wives helped with field work and how much their husbands helped in household tasks was learned. The

[42] The patterns probably are valid. They correspond with the groups with whom the operator and his wife spend holidays. Great families with familistic sociability patterns most often sponsor regular family reunions. These data and the method of developing patterns may be seen in appendix B, tables F and G.

[43] Little association was found between familism in farming and the patterns of sociability ($C = .27$; $df = 12$; $p = < .50$). Some families confined their social life largely to themselves. But these families appeared to be no more numerous among the familistic in their farming than among others.

[44] In 64 couples, the wife shared quite fully in both of these activities, in 53 couples she shared in one or the other of the two activities, and in only 17 of the 134 couples did the husband write the checks and also make the major farm decisions with little or no assistance.

[45] Check writing: $C = .17$; $df = 4$; $p = < .50$. Major farm decisions: $C = .13$; $df = 4$; $p = < .70$.

division or the exchange of labor in caring for a garden and for poultry was also asked.[46] Crude scores for sharing work in the marriage pair were devised. How often the couple helped each other, as contrasted with how strictly they divided their labor, was the basis of the scores. They were calculated as follows: Wife helps in the field, or husband helps in the house: often—2; seldom—1; not at all—0; both have some part in caring for the garden—1; for the poultry—1. The resulting scores ranged from 0 to 6. But sharing of work in the marriage pair, thus measured, was only slightly associated with security on the land.

To be sure that the procedure of scoring didn't hide the actual interaction, the couples were classified according to their sharing of the two tasks which most clearly belonged to men or to women: field work and house work. In 13 couples both helped the other often; in 35 frequent help went one way only; and in 85 neither helped the other often. This classification also failed to yield a significant association with security on the land.[47] None of the component elements in the scoring procedure was itself associated with security on the land.[48]

Even with some allowance for difficulties of measurement there is almost no evidence that either type of interaction in the conjugal unit—sharing of responsibilities or sharing of work tasks between the marriage pair—was associated significantly with security on the land.

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[46] Almost half of the wives currently did not help with the field work, and more than a fourth helped seldom. Almost half of the husbands never helped in the house, although about a fourth helped seldom. More wives than husbands cared for the garden alone, but in most pairs both shared this task. Often the husband's work in the garden consisted of using the field cultivator. Poultry, other than turkeys, was the responsibility of the wife in more than half of the (conjugal) families who had poultry. A number of families had no poultry or garden. The wife often reared the chicks and cared for them in the summer, and the husband did the chicken chores along with the rest in the winter.

[47] Sharing both field work and house work: $C = .23$; $df = 4$; $p = < .20$. These methods of measurement perhaps neutralize two cause and effect relationships: according to the expectation of our hypothesis, cooperative sharing within the conjugal unit should produce security on the land. However, sharing of tasks may be as much a product of security on the land as an effect. Insecure, struggling farm operators are likely to receive aid from their wives and to give no aid in return. The most secure operators, especially those nearing retirement, probably helped their wives without help in return. The type of interaction in the marriage pair considered here is modified somewhat by the age of the couple and by the composition of the entire conjugal unit and household. Perhaps a strict division of labor is as much a type of sharing as is a flexible division. Finally, information concerning sharing work tasks is difficult to get accurately. Among farm people the division of labor, especially the helping in the house by the husband, seemed to be a fit topic only for joking, not for discussion, much as the anthropologists find joking relationships between certain persons in preliterate societies. Consequently the information may vary not only with the facts, but with the sex of the informant and the circumstances of the interview.

[48] Sharing field work: $C = .07$; $df = 4$; $p = < .98$.
Sharing house work: $C = .12$; $df = 4$; $p = < .80$.
Sharing garden care: $C = .14$; $df = 6$; $p = < .90$.
Sharing poultry care: $C = .05$; $df = 4$; $p = < .50$.

FAMILY COMPOSITION

How many siblings or how many brothers a farm operator has, seems unrelated to his security on the land. It was expected that parents could not aid a large family as readily as a small family. The number of brothers was considered separately because some families help sons more than daughters. But it looks as if numerous kin may be as much a source of security on the land as a handicap in attaining it.

ETHNICITY

The folkways of ethnic groups sometimes include successful methods for achieving farm ownership or otherwise attaining security on the land. National origin and church preference were taken as indexes of ethnicity. No relationship between either index and security on the land could be seen from careful inspection of detailed arrays and mathematical tests.[49]

FAMILY AFFLUENCE IN FARMING

In previous analyses involving familism in farming, the willingness of the great family to help its members was investigated. This time the *ability* of the great family, regardless of its willingness, was the independent variable. The measure of family ability was farm ownership by the parents of the operator or his wife at the time of their marriage. This measure was extremely rough because neither the size of farms owned nor mortgage encumbrance was taken into account. When so crudely measured, family affluence in farming failed by a little to be significantly related to security on the land. It is possible that with more data or with more precise data a significant association would be found.

SUMMARY

Trying to account for security on the land through family factors, other than familism in farming as it was previously measured, was quite unsuccessful. This was true in spite of the fact that several of the family factors used were not themselves significantly joined with familism in farming. The exception was kinship in tenancy which, of the several factors considered, is the most like familism in farming. The farm wealth of a great family may yet be significantly related to security on the land because the measure used was very rough.

Transferring farms within the family to owner-operators, familism in sociability, interaction in the conjugal unit (shar-

[49] By similar reasoning familism might be expected to be associated with ethnicity. However, in this county familism and national origin were not significantly linked ($C = .22$; $df = 16$; $p = < .98$). Nor were familism and church preference concomitants ($C = .33$; $df = 12$; $p = < .20$).

ing of responsibilities and work tasks by the marriage pair), family composition and ethnicity, as measured here, failed to account for security on the land in Hamilton County.

CONCLUSIONS

INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS

THE RELATIONSHIPS FOUND

The main finding of this study was that there is some relationship between farm operators' security on the land and the familism in farming of their great families. The association found was statistically significant but not close. Both familism and security were measured roughly. But even with allowance for inexact measurement, relatively little of farm operators' security on the land could be predicted from the familism in farming of their great families in this area in 1946.

Yet it is remarkable that in an area so uniformly prosperous and commercial in its farming, a significant relationship was found at all! One expects to find familism in a society that resembles a folk[50] or sacred[51] model. Individualism is expected in a secular or urban-like society. To find group-oriented farming, basically sacred behavior, where so many other phases of farming are commercial and secular is surprising. If traditional, primary group behavior is outmoded in a secular society, why should security on the land be at all related to familism?

Mathematical tests of association do not show cause or effect. The interpretation that familism in farming produces security on the land must be justified or rejected in other ways.

There is some evidence that security on the land produces familistic behavior. A great family that has only a minimum of security finds it very hard to behave familistically.[52]

But there is considerably more evidence that familism in farming produces security on the land. Some farm operators were obviously indebted to their great families for whatever security on the land they possessed. Many more seemed to

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[50] Redfield, Robert. The Folk Society. The American Journal of Sociology, **LII:** 293-308. January, 1947.
——— Rural Sociology and the Folk Society. Rural Sociology, **8:** 68-71. March, 1943.

[51] Wiese, Leopold von, and Becker, Howard. Systematic Sociology. pp. 222-226. John Wiley and Sons, New York. 1932.
Barnes, Harry Elmer, and Becker, Howard. Social Thought From Lore to Science. Vol. I. Ch. I. D. C. Heath and Company, New York. 1938.

[52] A few farmers whose fathers might otherwise have helped them said, "My Dad had more than he could do to keep himself going during hard times without worrying about helping me to get started."

owe their families a great deal. Very few farmers from families low in familism had achieved high security. Sometimes high familism was linked with low security. When it was, it often looked as if the farm operator would have had no foothold in farming at all without the family cooperation.

WHY NOT A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP?

If familism in farming tends to produce security on the land, why was it not more successful?

Reasons are numerous. The land boom after the first World War resulted in mortgage foreclosures on a high proportion of Iowa farms. The epidemic psychology of the boom affected the familistic as well as others. Very few farmers then could see ahead as clearly as we can look back. Among the few who saw the risks, the familistic had the pressure of sons needing places encouraging them to overexpand.

One can see now that the farmers who had overexpanded were often best off if they gave up quickly and started over. Many had no choice. Others saw that the discrepancy between their realty debt and their farm income was an impossible situation. So they permitted foreclosure while they had something left. When struggling against foreclosure was futile, the familistic had two peculiar handicaps. They had more family money and family labor available to pour into the futile effort; and their sentimental attachments to particular farms caused them to struggle longer and harder. Familism simply prolonged the agony. Besides failing to hold the farm, young men in some of these families started for themselves late.

These same foreclosures made opportunities for others to buy which probably would not have been available otherwise. Insurance companies, prodded a bit by the Iowa legislature, sold farms to farmers who had only a small down payment and courage. In the late thirties the costs of owning and paying for a newly purchased farm were often less per year than rent. Some of the familistic began a second time too, of course, but others probably gained more than they did in the upset of the status quo.

The high commodity prices during the second World War enabled many farmers to pay off their mortgages and helped others to save the purchase price of a farm. The occupational histories of a few farm operators of middle age or older showed clearly that in the past they had had low familism and low security on the land. But in 1946 these unfamilistic operators ranked fairly well in security among men their age because of purchases and payments they had been able to make only recently.

The effects of familism in great families can be seen more

clearly in the occupational histories of farm operators than in their security on the land in 1946. Men from families that placed group welfare ahead of personal, as compared with others, spent fewer years as hired men or in nonfarm work, and more years on the home farm without operatorship. They had been much longer on the farms and in the communities where they lived when visited. Past experiences were not affected by wartime high prices as much as security on the land in 1946 was. This may be why these phases of occupational history are more definitely associated with familism than is present security on the land.

Although familism tends to produce security, it is no easy road to security on the land. The familistic must work as hard as others. They often make the same mistakes when facing the hazards of the business cycle. At times family aid can be a detriment to both the receiver and the giver. And many of the most important economic opportunities of farming fall, like rain, on the familistic and the individualistic alike.

SUGGESTIONS FOR RESEARCH

METHODOLOGICAL SUGGESTIONS

More rigorous quantitative methods have been used in this investigation than has been customary in tenure studies. It must never be thought that mathematical analyses will either substitute for keenness of insight or improve faulty data. Yet the development of quantitative methods, perhaps similar to those used here, should be continued.

Investigating relatively large universes through careful sampling procedures permits broader generalization than does a 100 percent survey of a smaller area. It costs very little more, if any. It ought to be done more often.

The finding here that the great family is of some significance for tenure circumstances and experience is a caution against the use of block sampling in tenure research. If families strive to settle near one another, a block area may reflect unduly a single great family.

In this study tenure circumstance as such has not been the object of investigation. Instead the goal of farmers and their wives, security on the land, has been studied. Tenure circumstances have been involved in measuring security on the land. But ownership, tenancy, the terms of leases or the amounts of mortgages have not been the final objects of study. Other studies might concentrate on net worth, profits, the availability of leisure time, and other goals of farmers. They might use tenure circumstances as evidence or partial evidence of the attainment of these goals. But in so doing land tenure would be placed more nearly in its "proper"

perspective. It would appear not as the goal but as a means to farmers' goals. It is possible that some farmers wish to own farms purely for the sake of owning a farm. But it is likely that most farmers who want to own a farm want to own it because they think ownership will bring prestige, profits, security on the land or something else they want. Better understanding of farmers' psychology should follow if the goals of farmers were more often studied and if ownership and tenancy, as such, were studied less. The significance of certain tenure conditions in one area often will be missed if they are interpreted according to their significance among another group. Viewing tenure circumstances as means rather than as ends might make interregional comparisons more meaningful than they are at present.

The method for measuring security on the land, ranking farm operators within age groups on a continuum of security, has not previously been used so far as the writer knows. It has the merit of holding age relatively constant without complicated computation. It permits a comparison of the success of various categories of farmers. Perhaps the general idea can be used in other studies.

In this study familism was measured through an index of five factors. Better methodology would be achieved if such an index were standardized by formally testing its validity and reliability.

The factors of familism selected here stressed the actual performance of great families. If familism is an attitude of willingness to subordinate self-interest, perhaps an index based more heavily upon verbal statements would be as good or better.

In any event, the effort to measure so elusive a concept as familism in farming should not be given up. It is unlikely that the effectiveness of familistic behavior can be determined better by returning to impressionistic, nonquantitative descriptions of its extent.

NEXT STEPS FOR RESEARCH

Every social scientist welcomes further testing of the same and similar hypotheses. The hypotheses tested here might well be tested in other areas and other times. The exploratory nature of this study makes it possible to point out some other directions for further work.

A random sample of farm operators of all ages, ranging from 21 to 86 years, was the basis of this investigation. The relationship between familism in farming and security on the land was not the same for all age groups. Perhaps the connection between familism in farming and security on the land varies with the farm operator's life cycle, with the family cycle of his great family, or with the historical time period.

Each of these possibilities deserves investigation.

Perhaps familism is most important to men who are under 35 years of age, or to men who want to start as farm operators. Special studies of certain age groups or of men who aspire to take the same step on the agricultural ladder should be made.

Perhaps familism is most fruitful at a particular phase of the family's life cycle. Some of the men who got off to the best start as farm operators took over the farms at their fathers' death. This fact suggests that stages in the family's life cycle may hasten or delay the fortunes of particular family members. Detailed studies of the relevance of the family life cycle in various steps of the tenure process could be made.

If "normal times" exist, perhaps familism is more effective in "normal times" or periods of relatively stable prices than in either booms or depressions. The significance of certain years would be much clearer if they were studied separately. Or studies can be made at regular intervals in the same areas.

Many analyses that were not made in this research could be made if a similar but much larger sample were drawn and interviewed.

An urgent need is for studies that will begin with all who aspire for security on the land at a given time and follow them through a period of time, if possible a lifetime. The study reported here, like most others, begins with the operators now on farms. The follow-up study is more expensive by far. But one study carefully planned to trace the future of all those who try to climb the agricultural ladder, including those who fall off, might be worth more than several cross-sectional surveys that include only the successes and partial successes. Generalizing from a random sample of farm operators is better than generalizing from a sample of farm owners. Generalizations concerning tenure history and the effects of familism would be still better if farm laborers were included in the universe with farm operators.[53] But the best-designed study, where feasible, would begin with all who plan a career in farming and include the story of those who fell by the wayside.

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[53] This study was planned to include farm laborers and their great families. When it was seen that much of the interviewing would be done in winter, the off season for farm laborers in Hamilton County, the plan was abandoned. Project 1067 of the Iowa Experiment Station, "The social status and prospects of married farm laborers in Cherokee County, Iowa, 1949," will supplement this lack.

Farm laborers are taken into account in Trends in the Tenure Status of Farm Workers in the United States Since 1880, USDA, BAE, 1948, by Carl C. Taylor, Louis J. Ducoff and Margaret Jarman Hagood. They include wage work on farms as one type of relationship to the land. For greater accuracy, regarding farm labor as a tenure status should become usual procedure.

Familism in farming may be associated with other goals of farm people besides security on the land. Further studies might show that net worth, level of living or farm income varies with the action of great families.

Finding familism in farming associated with security on the land suggests that the familism of the great family in activities besides farming may help individuals in other phases of life. For example, belonging to a great family that has considerable social cohesiveness may be reflected in individuals' psychological "security" or well-being.

An important general suggestion follows from finding sacred family behavior even slightly effective in a commercial agriculture. Perhaps even more secular spheres of modern life are also affected by traditional and folk influences. For example, the fate of corporations, as well as farm enterprises, may sometimes hinge upon the family connections of the principal persons involved, other primary group relations, or traditional, irrational ways of thinking and acting.

The emphasis of this study has been to learn whether a spirit of family unity has been an important factor in the farm experience of farm operators in a quite wealthy farming area. There has been little emphasis on discovering the particular practices of families that are successful. More studies that search for the successful techniques of family action should be made.

SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTION AND POLICY MAKING

Familism in farming appears to have helped the farmers of this prosperous Corn Belt county to achieve security on the land. So farmers and others will want to know how it is done.

This study was planned to find out *whether* the familism in farming of great families has affected the security on the land of farm operators. It was not planned to find out *how* the most successful great families do it. So there aren't as many nor as definite suggestions for action as some readers would like. Some of the suggestions are based on the experience of only a few families. All of them should be viewed as recommendations to be considered, not instructions to follow.

Subordinating self-interests to the interests of the family group in farming was the definition of familism that is the basis of the study. Reasoning from the findings, give and take within a family can be recommended. But it is doubtful whether a family that has no previous policy of family cooperation or tradition of family unity can suddenly decide to put the group first in their farming. A few families obviously could never do it. Their normal behavior appeared to be ambivalence, a "cordial dislike" and an agreement to quarrel

with one another. Quite a few families that now behave somewhat familistically could do more of it. The most familistic can be encouraged to keep on.

Family wrangling occurs fairly frequently in Hamilton County. Neighbors sometimes predict that a family will quarrel over the settlement of an estate. Most families that own a farm will have to settle an estate sooner or later. If they think mainly about individual shares in a bookkeeping value, the questions of when to sell, to whom and for how much are likely to create friction. If the family will subordinate self-interests and prize their family unity, good feeling is more likely. Knowing techniques for solving family problems undoubtedly helps. But within limits, there probably is no substitute for the genuine subordination of individual interests for the sake of the group.

Keeping the farm unit intact is often an incidental but valuable result of familistic attitudes and action. Concern for the home farm may keep it from being parceled into inconvenient fragments.

The several factors of the index of familism are clues to further suggestions. Families can help the younger generation get started for themselves as farm operators.[54] Retiring fathers can help sons begin. A widow can often help at least one child start if the other children are willing. Being able to begin gradually by using the home farm as a base for farming adjacent land has helped many farmers become independent operators. Lending machinery also helps. A few fathers expanded the home farm to let their boys start with them. The son branched off alone later. A rather small "stake" from the family can be the margin of difference between making a start or not. Loans are often made within families. If the risk is not too great, cosigning notes by a relative may be as useful as a family loan. Some parents who can spare it give children part of their inheritance "in advance." The children usually need it more when they are young than they would later. A well established child might turn out to be a "good investment" for the parent too.

Everyone can see how a gift would help a beginner. But other types of family assistance are found more often than gifts. They seem just as effective, even though the family is later repaid. Having resources available at the right time can be very important to a young man His family may trust him when others wouldn't.

Finding a farm is often the toughest problem for the beginner. A farm operator who already has started probably can

[54] A special analysis of the effectiveness of family help in "Beginning as a Farm Operator" in this county can be seen in Rural Sociology, **14**: 325-335.

find a farm more easily than the beginner can. So the same family farm can sometimes be used to start more than one beginner if the whole family wants it to. Families that own no farms often help their younger generation find places by vouching for them and recommending them to landlords.

Working together of the family in regular farming activities was the second factor in the index. It showed up poorly in the analysis that considered each factor separately. This poor showing probably indicates that other groups besides the family can serve in work exchange as well or almost as well as members of the great family.

The proportion of siblings farming is too indirect a measure of family unity to contain a useful suggestion for action. But families can be urged to keep the home farm family-owned and operated if they are interested in the security on the land of their kinsmen. Many Hamilton County farms have slipped away from families that once owned them without encumbrance. They were lost because one heir had to give a mortgage to a commercial lending agency to pay out coheirs. If the other children are not seriously handicapped by it, keeping the equity within the family seemed to bring more advantages to a family than disadvantages.

Business dealings within the family included renting, buying, lending, cosigning, and cooperative ownership of machinery, equipment and breeding stock. There are both safety and danger in such arrangements.[55] If intelligence is combined with familistic unselfishness, intrafamily dealing can be recommended.

A family that is in the habit of unselfishly working things out can take the shocks out of market fluctuations. The original transactions of some families are not made at market price. Other families revise their agreements if inflation or deflation has changed the original intentions of their family bargain. For example, a son may buy his father's livestock and equipment at one price if "times stay good" with the promise of adjustment in the price if "things go up or down."

Family cooperation must take place under the prevailing legal system. Family intentions should be geared to legal requirements or one uncooperative member can take advantage of others. For example, failure to keep a will up to date

[55] For example, a foresighted father saw that his son was determined to buy a farm at the inflated price of $350 per acre. The father didn't want to sell but sold to keep the son from losing his savings as he would have if he had bought from a nonrelative. The next year things broke. The father foreclosed, but gave the boy back his $50 per acre down payment. On the other hand, two cases of severe hardship resulting from cosigning notes for untrustworthy relatives were found. A widow with seven children still struggled with a 20-year-old mortgage while the defaulting relatives of the husband prospered without helping. The familistic need good judgment of land values and character, as well as skilled farm management, as badly as anyone else.

during declining land prices caused one father to penalize a son whom he meant to repay for helping him hold his farm.

Father and son-in-law frequently cooperated successfully. Family arrangements need not be limited to sons who bear the family name.

A number of related tenants were found who could not buy their farms because the landlords would not sell. If social security were extended to cover farmers, retired farmers would be assured of a lifelong income besides rent. Some of them might then be willing to sell their farms sooner than they do now.

Extension workers, educators, editors and others who counsel with farmers might well suggest that nonrelatives as well as relatives develop techniques for cooperation. The relationship between familism and security, after all, was not very close. Apparently the problems of farming can be worked out in other groups and other relationships besides the family. A family-like spirit of working together and similar practices for cooperation can be encouraged between nonrelatives. A banker's loan may start a young farmer as well as help from a parent or brother. The distinctive part of related tenancy is not kinship but the quality of the landlord-tenant relationship that kinship implies. The same mutual expectations are occasionally found between nonrelatives. Farm sellers, both persons and corporations, sometimes give buyers most of the few advantages that customarily go with purchases within the family in this area. Relationships with nonrelatives appear to serve less well, but almost as well, as those within the great family, and perhaps they could be improved.

Clergymen especially may wish to encourage their parishioners to help deserving young farmers who want to start for themselves. Many religious values came from extending family patterns of behavior to include others, and proper religious behavior is often described in family terms such as brotherhood. Perhaps childless farm couples, farm parents whose children don't farm, or others can be encouraged to help nonrelatives to begin farming as if they were members of the great family. It has been done before. More than one Hamilton County farmer, describing his start, said of his benefactor, "He started me up just as if I were his own son." The farm owner or lender who considers helping a young man get started need not think in terms of giving. Gifts are not prominent even among the methods that great families use to help their young begin. In dealing with a beginner, he may take a somewhat greater risk than would be involved in a lease or a loan to an established farmer. Perhaps clergymen will want to encourage a reorientation of values—the pleasure

of helping a young couple get started instead of the greater economic safety in helping a large farmer farm still more.

Government agencies should not overlook the importance of the great family in farming. Having a cooperative great family in the area may be an asset that should be figured in when considering someone's application for a loan. The number of states in every part of the nation that have published bulletins on father-son farming agreements indicates that the great family must be important in other areas too.[56] Though correct legal procedures between kin probably should be encouraged, the importance of familism, the willingness to subordinate individual interests, should also be stressed.

Citizens and legislators will want to know the relevance of the findings concerning familism for public policy. Those who want to see large-scale and corporate farming handicapped will favor measures that make family cooperation easier. Those who are more concerned about the unfortunate farmer without family connections will not wish to see familism encouraged in public policy.

APPENDIX A. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES

Cases are presented to illustrate the relationship between familism in farming and security on the land. No new analyses are made.

Three life stories show the hypothesized, close relationship between familism in farming and security on the land:

1 high familism, high security;
1 low familism, low security;
1 medium familism, medium security.

Two show the less numerous instances in which the relationship was contrary to the central hypothesis:

1 high familism, low security;
1 low familism, high security.

In these life stories the reader may see the undissected case materials and judge for himself the adequacy of the measurements used.

The five interviews reported are not the result of special case study. Similar information was obtained in the interviews of the other 141 cases. Table 12, following, indicates graphically the source of the cases presented.

In statistical terminology, the first three cases (low-low, medium-medium and high-high) illustrate "the regression

[56] The generalizations of this study apply only to the universe investigated, Hamilton County, Iowa, in 1946. However, similar findings might be made elsewhere. Hamilton County differs from other areas of Iowa mainly in being one of the state's most prosperous counties. Its tenure customs and conditions and the farming behavior of its great families probably are basically similar to those in large areas of Iowa, and perhaps other places.

TABLE 12. SECURITY ON THE LAND OF 146 FARM OPERATORS BY THE FAMILISM IN FARMING OF THEIR GREAT FAMILIES.

Security on the land (rank in "thirds")	Familism in farming (index of factors present)					Total
	Low	Medium		High		
	0 & 1	2	3	4	5	
Most secure	5 / Case 5 /	5	12	16	8 / Case 1 /	46
Middle security	11	11	14 / Case 3 /	6	8	50
Least secure	14 / Case 2 /	11	10	10 / Case 4 /	5	50
Total	30*	27	36	32	21	146

* Eleven of these 30 cases scored 0 on the simple index, and 19 scored 1.

of Y on X," while the other two cases (high-low and low-high) illustrate "the deviations from regression." A restatement of the principal conclusion is that the extent of the relationships of the former type somewhat outweighs the latter.

These cases are real-life situations reported with fictitious names and with identifying details altered to protect the anonymity of the persons described. They are not ideal types or "average" constructs. They were selected primarily to illustrate the relationship between the two variables of the central hypothesis, but the essential features of each case were found in others; none is unique in basic outline.

HIGH FAMILISM, HIGH SECURITY

CASE 1, SCORE ON SIMPLE INDEX—5

Lester Schmidt, age 26, left home at 19 and worked in a grocery 2 years, long enough to learn he didn't like it. He married and began farming for himself 6 years before we saw him. His father gave them some hogs, and his father-in-law gave some cows by way of "advance inheritance," as well as lending machinery. The young couple also borrowed some money from a bank. They began on a farm belonging to Mrs. Schmidt's father, who "inherited" it from his father-in-law while the latter was living. He, in turn, had acquired it from his father, Mrs. Schmidt's great-grandfather. Mrs.

Schmidt's father owned this 120-acre farm and the 300-acre farm on which he lived. He and Schmidt operated part of the large farm in partnership. Mrs. Schmidt was the second of three children and the young couple assumed that this farm sometime would be theirs. Meanwhile they received a very substantial concession in rental and were installing plumbing at their own expense at the time of the interview. Said Schmidt, "This is better than owning!" Lester was the oldest of six living children, the four oldest of whom had finished high school and farmed. His father lost a farm in the depression and then rented "the old home place" from his grandparents.

Lester's farming hardly can be described except in terms of the great family.

LOW FAMILISM, LOW SECURITY

CASE 2, SCORE ON SIMPLE INDEX—1

Don Dunlap, age 28, operated a 320-acre farm which had changed hands five times since 1913. The landlord was around the place often fixing this or that and sharing in many farm management decisions. Don doubted that he could stay on this farm long (and the courthouse records in March 1947 showed that the farm had been sold still another time). Despite his insecurity Don had made good profits and was torn between his desire to buy a farm of his own and the current high price of land. He began farming at age 21 by renting his father's machinery and his father's farm on a partnership arrangement while the father quit farming to take up auctioneering. However, Don was much opposed to partnerships with relatives or anyone else and left home "to get away from it." When Don left, his father rented to "strangers" since Don was the only one who farmed of the four children who had finished school. When asked what finally will become of his father's farm he replied, "It will probably go to the seven kids, but I don't suppose we would know about it even if there was a will." Don's work exchange was limited to nonrelatives. He had married 5 years ago and this was his third tenancy in 8 years of operatorship.

Don's farming had been largely outside the great family and he operated a big place but with little security of occupancy.

MEDIUM FAMILISM, MEDIUM SECURITY

CASE 3, SCORE ON SIMPLE INDEX—3

George Billings, age 53, bought 160 acres in 1940 from an insurance company. The farm was the object of speculation in the 1920's, selling once for $400 an acre. George had done well in paying off but still owed on it. Said he, "If hogs stay

at $25 a hundred (weight) just a while longer I can do it." He also rented the farm land on another quarter. The landlord and his wife lived in the house and used the building site on this rented quarter.

George was one of 10 children, six of whom farmed. One of his brothers farmed the home place in Missouri as extra land without living in the buildings himself. The home farm in Mrs. Billings' family had been similarly handled by her brother, but in 1946 the buildings stood empty and the land was rented off.

George left home at age 19 and spent 6 years working in a foundry, 2 in the army, 4 as a single hired man and 5 as a married hired man before starting to farm for himself in 1930. He began by buying out his former employer's livestock and equipment, borrowing half the money from a bank and half from his sister-in-law.

The Billings had five children. The two oldest were boys, and had finished high school. One was in the army and the other farmed at home with his father. George thought that soon he would "have to pay him wages" to keep him on the farm although the boy liked farming and had been stimulated by his Future Farmers' projects. The Billings had at least vague plans for helping their children to establish themselves in farming. George exchanged work only with nonrelatives. Mrs. Billings said that anyone who could afford his own machinery wouldn't bother with cooperative ownership or use.

In 10 years of renting they occupied three farms. George took no credit for prudent judgment in buying this farm in 1940 just before the upswing in prices but called it "pure, dumb luck." Most of the down payment was a loan from the local banker. George added, however, that he had worked hard enough all of his life to deserve some luck finally.

George's security on the land was only moderate for a farmer his age, and the familism in farming of his great family was near the median pattern.

HIGH FAMILISM, LOW SECURITY

CASE 4, SCORE ON SIMPLE INDEX—4

Nels Swedstrom, age 59, was born on the farm he operated in 1946. He lived there all his life except for 4 years of working in an office. But when visited he rented this farm from an urban investment purchaser who owned numerous farms. Nels could farm as he liked and thought he could stay on. Nels's father bought the first part of the farm in 1887 and built new all of the excellent buildings and house in the early 'twenties. But he mortgaged the home place to buy more property, and the family lost it all. Two of Nels's sisters

became school teachers and the other boy did not farm. The teachers each lost $10,000 of savings with which they tried to help the father hold the home farm. Nels, too, held title for a while. The loss was a difficult emotional adjustment for the family.

Nels started farming through help from his father and a supplementary loan from a nonrelative. This farm was a half section that one of Nels's sons worked with him.

Nels still believed firmly in family cooperation. It simply wasn't sufficient to compensate for his Dad's overexpansion in the 1920 land boom.

LOW FAMILISM, HIGH SECURITY

CASE 5, SCORE ON SIMPLE INDEX—1

H. D. Williams, age 59, owned a farm which had been foreclosed a time or two before the land bank got it. H. D. and his wife bought this 130-acre farm in 1937 and they paid off the mortgage early in 1946, besides remodeling and improving the building site extensively.

H. D. was the only farmer among 11 children. Most of the rest were railroad workers. He left home at 15 years of age, and worked on farms 7 years before borrowing from a bank to begin farming. He had married 2 years before beginning to rent. After 7 years of renting, on two different farms, they bought a farm of 240 acres. They did not like this farm, sold it, and paid more per acre for a 160-acre farm. Prices fell and they could not hold it but they salvaged enough from their equity to buy another much poorer farm. Finally it too was lost and they wound up later with only an acreage. For 4 years H. D. did not farm at all but operated a cafe. Only a heavy mortgage enabled them to begin again toward their goal of unencumbered farm ownership.

The home farm had been lost when the estate administrator, H. D.'s brother, let another brother borrow on it to expand in "high times." In Mrs. Williams' family, too, the home farm was lost. The Williams exchanged work only with nonrelatives, didn't go out much, and worked exceedingly hard to pay for and improve the farm, as they had before. Their son worked in town and their daughter and son-in-law farmed in another community.

Despite their full share of reverses and little familism in farming, H. D. and his wife finally seemed to be securely situated on their modest sized farm.

Cases in which one variable is medium and the other is either high or low have not been illustrated at all, even though they included more than two-fifths of the entire sample. However, they can be visualized readily as variations of the more clear-cut situations described and from case 3.

APPENDIX B

SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES

TABLE A. PROPORTIONS OF TENANCY, 1880-1945, IN THE UNITED STATES, IOWA, AND HAMILTON COUNTY, IOWA* (in percentages).

Year	U. S.	Iowa	Hamilton County
1880	25.6	23.8	29.1
1890	28.4	28.1	26.3
1900	35.3	34.9	35.9
1910	37.0	37.8	40.6
1920	38.1	41.7	46.6
1925	38.6	44.7	50.1
1930	42.4	47.3	54.1
1935	42.1	49.6	54.2
1940	38.7	47.6	49.5
1945	31.7	42.2	49.3

* From the several U. S. Censuses of Agriculture. Manager-operated farms are negligible, rarely more than 1 percent of the total, so that the remainder of these proportions are primarily owner-operated farms.

TABLE B. APPROXIMATE STANDARD ERRORS FOR SAMPLES OF 146 AND 76 CASES.

Proportion or percent	Standard error of proportion* based on	
	146 cases	76 cases
.02	.012	.016
.05	.018	.025
.10	.025	.034
.20	.033	.046
.30	.038	.053
.40	.041	.056
.50	.041	.057
.60	.041	.056
.70	.038	.053
.80	.033	.046
.90	.025	.034
.95	.018	.025
.98	.012	.016

* McCormick, T. C. Elementary Social Statistics. pp. 238-239. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York. 1941.

TABLE C. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE IN SECURITY ON THE LAND FOR COMPARING METHODS OF TESTING THE CENTRAL HYPOTHESIS.

Row	Source of variation	Degrees of freedom	Sum of squares	Mean square
a	Due to regression on simple index	1	4.2056	4.2056
b	Discrepance (between a and c)	4	3.5826	0.8956
c	Due to regression on the five factors	5	7.7882	1.5576
d	Deviations from regression on the five factors	140	88.1022	0.6293
e	Total	145	95.8904	

$F = a/b + d = \frac{4.2056}{0.6367} = 6.61^*$; $n_1 = 1$; $n_2 = 144$; $F_{.05} = 3.92$; $F_{.01} = 6.84$†

$F = c/d \quad \frac{1.5576}{0.6293} = 2.48^*$; $n_1 = 5$; $n_2 = 140$; $F_{.05} = 2.29$; $F_{.01} = 3.17$

$F = b/d \quad \frac{0.8956}{0.6293} = 1.42$; $n_1 = 4$; $n_2 = 140$; $F_{.05} = 2.44$

† Snedecor, op. cit., p. 225.

TABLE D. DATE OF PURCHASE AND ENCUMBRANCE HISTORY TO 1946 OF 76 FARM OWNERS WHO OPERATE FARMS.

Year purchased	Unencumbered farms: year cleared		Encumbered farms: owner's equity		Total
	1943-46	Before '43	76% or more	Under 76%	
Before 1910	1	5	0	0	6
1910-19	2	2	3	2	9
1920-29	4	2	3	1	10
1930-36	1	3	0	0	4
1937-39	6	6	5	1	18
1940-42	2	0	10	3	15
1943-46	9	xx	2	3	14
Total	25	18	23	10	76

Thirty-four of the 76 farms were acquired within the family but only eight were inherited clear, and two of these are now encumbered. Most of the inherited equities were very small; coheirs and creditors possessed the larger equities.

To be noted in table D is the extent to which farms have been cleared recently, and the proportion of farms which are nearly clear even though recently purchased.

TABLE E. PLACE OF BIRTH OF A SAMPLE OF THE FARM OPERATORS IN HAMILTON COUNTY, IOWA, 1946.

Place of birth	Number of operators	Percent
On this farm	28	19
This community	47	32
This or an adjacent county	32	22
A more distant place	39	27
Total	146	100

TABLE F. PATTERNS OF SOCIABILITY: THE EXTENT TO WHICH 146 FARM OPERATORS AND THEIR CONJUGAL FAMILIES EXCHANGE MEALS WITH THE GREAT FAMILY BY THE EXCHANGE OF VISITS.

Exchange meals with	Exchange visits with			
	More nonkin than kin	Both evenly	More kin than nonkin	Total
More kin than nonkin	9	27	39	75
Both evenly	12	36	0	48
More nonkin than kin	22	1	0	23
Total	43	64	39	146

TABLE G. PATTERNS OF SOCIABILITY OF 146 FARM OPERATORS' CONJUGAL UNITS BY MANNER OF SPENDING HOLIDAYS AND SPONSORING OF REUNIONS IN THE GREAT FAMILY.

Pattern of sociability (see previous table)	No. of families	Percent spending holidays with both spouses' families or own children	Percent both spouses' families hold reunions
I. Meals and visits—kin	39	87	42
II. Meals—kin; visits—both	27	85	44
III. Meals—kin or both; visits—both or nonkin	45	68	39
IV. Meals—both or nonkin; visits—nonkin	35	70	26
Total	146		